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Abstract
This paper analyses the impact that ￿rms￿￿nancial position has on investment decisions
using panel data from a large sample of non-￿nancial corporations (around 120,000 ￿rms)
in six euro area countries (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain).
The results indicate that ￿nancial position is important to explain capital expenditures, as
￿nancial pressure appears relevant in explaining investment dynamics when it is proxied by
cash ￿ ow, indebtedness and debt burden. The results also show di⁄erences in the sensitivity
of investment rates to changes in ￿nancial pressure across countries, which appears to be
especially large in the Netherlands and Italy and relatively small in Germany.
JEL Classi￿cation: C33, E22, G32, J23
Key words: ￿nancial pressure; ￿xed investment; balance sheet channel; panel data.5
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Non-technical summary
Financial frictions can amplify the impact of changes in interest rates on economic ac-
tivity. Accordingly, understanding the way in which ￿nancial conditions a⁄ect ￿rms￿demand
of productive factors becomes relevant for an optimal design of monetary policy. In addition,
in the context of the euro area, the knowledge of potential di⁄erences in the investment rate
sensitivity to changes in ￿rms￿￿nancial position across countries or across di⁄erent types of
￿rms is crucial for a better understanding of the impact of a single monetary policy.
This paper investigates the sensitivity of investment rates to changes in ￿rms￿￿nancial
position, using a large sample of non-￿nancial corporations in six major euro area countries
(Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain). We proxy ￿nancial pressure
using three ￿nancial ratios: pro￿tability, net indebtedness and the interest rate burden. The
expected relationship between the ￿rst ￿nancial ratio and investment activity is positive: ￿nanc-
ing constraints resulting from asymmetric information problems imply that ￿rms tend to invest
more when they have more internal resources available. As for the indebtedness ratio, although
debt may have some desirable properties (it allows ￿nancing projects in the absence of internal
resources), the commitment to repay the debt may have a negative in￿ uence on ￿rms￿spending
decisions (it might make it more di¢ cult for ￿rms to access additional credit to ￿nance new
investment projects). The third ratio measures ￿rms￿capacity to meet interest payments with
their earnings, and is also expected to present a negative relationship with investment rates.
The results show that ￿rms￿￿nancial position is important to explain their capital ex-
penditures since the three ￿nancial ratios considered are found to be signi￿cant when included in
an investment equation: indebtedness and debt burden are found to exert a negative impact on
investment, while cash ￿ ow is positively linked to it. We ￿nd a certain degree of heterogeneity
across countries in the magnitude of this impact: ￿rms in the Netherlands and Italy are found
to be the ones with the highest marginal impact of ￿nancial pressure on investment rates, while
the lowest has been found for German ￿rms.
In the paper we also give an insight on how, by altering the ￿nancial pressure experienced
by ￿rms in servicing their debt, monetary policy may operate through the corporate sector. A
simple exercise quanti￿es how much investment rates change across countries, ceteris paribus,
due to an increase in the cost of debt ￿nancing. Overall, taking into consideration our estimates
on the sensitivity of investment to changes in the debt burden and the levels of this ratio in each
country, the results show that Italian ￿rms would be the most a⁄ected.6
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1 Introduction
The analysis of the ￿nancial position of non-￿nancial corporations and their responses to ￿nan-
cial pressure are important elements in any assessment of the macroeconomic outlook, as ￿rms￿
￿nancial situation can condition ￿rms￿real decisions. For example, excessive indebtedness or a
high debt-service burden can have an adverse e⁄ect on investment spending, thereby contribut-
ing to deepen recessions or to delay or dampen upturns. Accordingly, understanding the way
in which ￿nancial conditions a⁄ect ￿rms￿demand of productive factors -and more speci￿cally
investment, which represents 20% of euro area GDP- becomes relevant for an optimal design of
monetary policy. In addition, in the context of the euro area, the knowledge of potential di⁄er-
ences in the investment rate sensitivity to changes in ￿rms￿￿nancial position across countries
or across di⁄erent types of ￿rms is crucial for a better understanding of the impact of a single
monetary policy.
As has been widely emphasized in the literature, credit market imperfections such as
asymmetric information problems result in a wedge between the cost of funds raised externally
(by issuing equity or debt) and funds generated internally (retained earnings). This wedge (the
external ￿nance premium) will depend on the borrower ￿nancial position (for example, it can
depend on the level of net wealth that can be provided as collateral), resulting in ￿rm ￿nancial
situation being relevant in determining its investment decisions. As the balance sheet channel
literature emphasizes, the existence of this external ￿nance premium implies that monetary
policy will be transmitted to ￿rms not only through the traditional interest rate channel, but
also through the impact it has on this premium: higher interest rates increase debt servicing
payments, erode cash ￿ ow and reduce collateral values, something that increases the external
￿nance premium and squeezes ￿rm demand for loans (the ￿nancial accelerator mechanism).
From the seminal paper by Fazzari et al. (1988), most of the discussion on the impact of
credit market imperfections on corporate investment has relied on the analysis of the response
of capital expenditures to cash ￿ ow. The basic working hypothesis behind this strand of the
￿nancing constraints literature is that this response should be higher ￿rms that face a larger
wedge between the cost of internal and external funds. However, much less work has been done
on the analysis that variables such as indebtedness or debt burden have on ￿rms￿spending
decisions.
This paper analyses how ￿rms￿￿nancial position a⁄ects their investment decisions. It
makes two contributions to the existing literature on this area. First, di⁄erently from most
previous papers analysing the impact of ￿nancial constraints on investment, we do not just7
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focus on investment sensitivity to cash ￿ ow ratios but also on the impact of changes in debt
burden and indebtedness on capital expenditures. Second, our analysis is based on a large panel
dataset with a high percentage of small and medium sized ￿rms (over 85% in four out of the
six countries considered -Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, which
broadly represent 90% of euro area GDP-), which are in fact those thought to be more a⁄ected
by asymmetric information problems and hence are likely to face a higher external ￿nance
premium. In contrast, much of the existing empirical work has been based on datasets with a
high proportion of large ￿rms, which are likely to su⁄er less from informational asymmetries
and have a better access to capital markets.
Looking at the results, we conclude that ￿rms￿￿nancial position is important to explain
their capital expenditures: indebtedness and debt burden are found to exert a negative impact
on investment, while cash ￿ ow is positively linked to it. We ￿nd a certain degree of heterogeneity
across countries in the magnitude of this impact: ￿rms in the Netherlands and Italy are found
to be the ones with the highest marginal impact of ￿nancial pressure on investment rates, while
the lowest has been found for German ￿rms.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on
the link between ￿rms￿investment decisions and ￿nancial factors. Section 3 describes the data
used. Section 4 provides a descriptive analysis on the relationship between investment rates
and ￿rms￿￿nancial position. Section 5 presents the model and the estimation method, and
the results are shown in Section 6. The potential reasons behind the di⁄erences in the results
across countries are presented in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 summarises the main results and
concludes.
2 Review of the literature
In the past years, a large body of the literature has provided robust empirical evidence that
￿nancial factors have a signi￿cant impact on ￿rms￿investment decisions. While traditional
research on investment was based on the neoclassical theory of optimal capital accumulation
(where, under the assumption of perfect capital markets, the cost of ￿nancing does not depend
on the ￿rm￿￿nancial position), more recent literature has increasingly incorporated frictions
such as asymmetric information and agency problems as a source behind the relevance of the
degree of ￿nancial pressure faced by the ￿rm in determining the availability and the costs of
external ￿nancing . In this sense, the extent to which these frictions a⁄ect capital expenditures8
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depends on the ￿rm￿balance sheet structure, which will determine its creditworthiness; higher
debt servicing payments, higher leverage or lower cash ￿ ow will have a negative impact on the
￿rm￿creditworthiness and hence, all else being equal, will increase the external ￿nance premium
and reduce the demand for external ￿nancing.
Starting with the seminal work by Fazzari et al. (1988), many empirical studies tested the
hypothesis that if external ￿nancing is available without frictions, a ￿rm￿ s investment should be
determined by its investment opportunities, usually proxied by Tobin￿ s Q, and not by its internal
resources, captured by a ￿rm￿ s cash ￿ ow. The higher sensitivity of investment or ￿rms￿growth to
internal sources was taken as evidence for the presence of ￿nancing constraints (see also Fazzari
et al., 2000, and Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). However, after the results presented by Kaplan
and Zingales (1997 and 2000), several studies have criticised the empirical test based on the cash
￿ ow sensitivity as a meaningful evidence in favour of the existence of ￿nancing constraints. The
signi￿cance of the cash ￿ ow sensitivity of investment, it was argued, may then be the consequence
of measurement errors in the usual proxy for investment opportunities, Tobin￿ s Q, and may
provide additional information on expected pro￿tability rather than being a signal of ￿nancing
constraints. For example, Gomes (2001) shows that the existence of ￿nancing constraints is
not su¢ cient to establish cash ￿ ow as a signi￿cant regressor in a standard investment equation,
while Ericson and Whited (2000) demonstrate that the investment sensitivity to cash ￿ ow in
regressions including Tobin￿s Q is to a large extent due to a measurement error in Q. Likewise,
Alti (2003) shows that investment can be sensitive to changes in cash ￿ ow in the benchmark
case where ￿nancing is frictionless. In this respect, Bond et al. (2003) indicate that if the role of
cash ￿ ow as proxy of future pro￿tability is similar across countries, interpreting higher cash ￿ ow
sensitivities in a country as an e⁄ect of ￿nancing constraints is less ambiguous and di⁄erences
in the estimated coe¢ cients of the cash ￿ ow variable across countries are more likely to re￿ ect
di⁄erences in ￿nancing constraints.
In this article, we will focus not only on the link between investment and cash ￿ ow
but also on other balance sheet indicators, namely the leverage level and the debt-servicing
payments, to analyze the impact of ￿nancial factors on ￿rms￿investment decisions of ￿rms.
In this respect, in the seminal paper, Meyers (1977) analyses possible externalities generated
by debt on shareholders￿and management optimal investment strategy. More generally, debt
overhang models explain two distinct sorts of implications: ex post (once the debt burden is
in place), they suggest that highly leveraged ￿rms will be particularly discouraged to invest
further, especially if new investment is ￿nanced by issuing claims that are junior to the existing
debt. Ex ante, they explain why even low-leveraged ￿rms may be reluctant to raise much debt,9
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even if this means foregoing some current investment projects.
The empirical evidence on the impact of leverage on investment is less extensive than
that focusing on the sensitivity of investment to cash ￿ ow variations. In Bond and Meghir (1994)
the external ￿nancing cost is shown to be dependent on the level of indebtedness by capital unit.
In the same line, Estrada and VallØs (1998) test, for a sample of Spanish companies, a model that
considers the level of net indebtedness as a determinant of the external ￿nancing cost. Lang et al.
(1996) and Aivazian et al. (2005), using US and Canadian data respectively, show that leverage
is negatively related to investment and that this negative e⁄ect is signi￿cantly stronger for ￿rms
with low growth opportunities than those with high growth opportunities. Likewise, Whited
(1992) ￿nds that ￿rms with higher leverage and higher ratio of interest expenses to cash ￿ ow
(that should therefore be more ￿nancially constrained than the others) have a higher investment-
cash ￿ ow sensitivity. In the same line, results in Benito and Hernando (2007) and Hernando
and Martinez-Carrascal (2008) indicate that the impact of indebtedness -and debt burden- on
investment is non-linear and becomes relatively more intense when ￿nancial pressure exceeds
a certain threshold. For the UK, Marchica and Mura (2007) investigate explicitly the impact
of a distinct leverage policy on the investment ability of ￿rms and ￿nd that the way the level
of external debt in￿ uences a company￿ s ability to invest may di⁄er depending on whether the
company is below or above its target leverage.
Our paper is closely related to the work of Benito and Hernando (2007) and Hernando
and Martinez-Carrascal (2008), which analyse the impact of alternative measures of ￿nancial
pressure on the investment and employment decisions of Spanish ￿rms We follow their choice
of ￿nancial indicators to proxy ￿rms￿￿nancial pressure and analyse their impact on investment
decisions for a set of ￿rms operating in six euro area countries, as it will be explained the
following section.
3 Data and sample overview
The source of the company database used in this study is AMADEUS of the Bureau van Dijk,
containing pro￿t and loss account and balance sheet data on private and publicly owned ￿rms
across eleven euro area countries in the period 1990-2005. For the purpose of the analysis we
considered euro area private listed and unlisted non-￿nancial enterprises. We excluded the ￿rst
three years because of the poor coverage across countries and lose some additional years for the
construction of the variables for the econometric analysis. We exclude ￿rms with investment10
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rates larger than 1, as this is probably a sign of merger or acquisition and those for which there
are less than six consecutive years of information on the variables of interest. The size of our
￿nal sample is around 120,000 ￿rms with about 900,000 observations. It predominantly consists
of unquoted ￿rms with only 2744 observations of quoted ￿rms. The countries covered in our
analysis are Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. Whenever available,
we use the consolidated annual accounts as these are considered to be most suitable for providing
information about the ￿nancial situation of a company with subsidiaries. When consolidated
data are not available, unconsolidated data are used. Moreover, since many small-and medium-
sized (SMEs) non-￿nancial ￿rms provide only unconsolidated accounts, we are able to include
in our sample a large number of SMEs, which would have been excluded otherwise1.
Table 1 presents some basic features of the dataset across countries. Starting from the
lower panel of the table, the sample could be easily divided into two di⁄erent groups of countries.
The ￿rst group (Belgium, France, Italy and Spain) is characterised by very high proportions of
SMEs (above 95% in all countries except for Belgium -87%-) and very low proportions of listed
companies (around or below 0.5%), in line with the size distribution in the actual population.
For the second group (Germany and the Netherlands) the samples show lower percentages of
SMEs (around 35%) and higher shares of listed companies (12% and 8%, respectively). The high
share of SMEs in the samples used (especially for the ￿rst one of these two groups of countries)
represents a clear di⁄erence with respect with most previous studies, which have used database
containing mainly large companies and higher proportions of quoted ￿rms. As for the sectoral
composition, the majority of ￿rms are in the manufacturing and trade sectors in Belgium, Italy,
Spain and the Netherlands while fewer are in the services sector. The sample of French ￿rms
is more evenly distributed among trade, manufacturing and services sectors, while the German
sample di⁄ers from the other countries since it contains a much higher percentage of ￿rms in
the services and in utilities, transport and communications sectors.
The upper panel of Table 1 reports the mean and median values of the variables used in
the econometric analysis (see Data Appendix detail on the de￿nition of the variables used). As
can be seen, the investment rate, the pro￿tability ratio and, more signi￿cantly, the debt burden
show a positively skewed distribution. The investment rate presents a median value around
11%-13% over the sample period except for Germany, where it is somewhat lower (9%). As can
be seen, in Chart 1, it reached its highest level in 1999-2000 in most countries and thereafter
declined until 2003, re￿ ecting the slowdown in economic growth in the euro area. At the same
1SMEs are ￿rms that satisfy two out of the following three conditions: maximum number of 250 employees,
maximum turnover of 50 mio. euro and maximum balance sheet total of 43 mio euro.11
ECB
Working Paper Series No 943
September 2008
time, ￿rms grow faster (if sales increase is taken as a proxy for growth) on average in Spain
and France, while Italian ￿rms have hardly grown on average during the sample period. In
all countries, the median sales growth rate recorded minimum values in 2002 and a recovery
afterwards, except in Spain. Spanish ￿rms showed the highest growth rates in the mid-nineties
and in contrast recorded, together with Italian ￿rms, the lowest increases at the end of the
sample period. As for the dispersion in sales growth, measured by the coe¢ cient of variation,
the largest values are observed in the Netherlands and in Spain.
Three ￿nancial ratios have been chosen as a proxy for ￿nancial pressure: pro￿tability,
net indebtedness and the interest rate burden. Pro￿tability (de￿ned as cash ￿ ow to total assets)
indicates that the typical Italian (proxied by the 50th percentile) is the one which faces higher
￿nancial pressure in comparison with the rest of the countries (see Chart 3). Its pro￿tability
ratio stands 50% below the ￿gure observed for the Netherlands, where the largest values are
recorded. The latter country recorded the largest drop in the early 2000s but has also shown
the most signi￿cant recovery afterwards. It is also noticeable the downward trend observed from
end-nineties in the median pro￿tability level in Spain.
The second ￿nancial ratio considered is net indebtedness, de￿ned as the ratio of out-
standing debt minus cash and its equivalent to total assets. It captures the importance of debt
for ￿rms once adjusted for liquidity at disposal. Debt includes trade credit, since for some coun-
tries there is no information on this variable for most of the companies in the sample. As can
be seen in Chart 4, a downward trend has been observed in the median value of this ratio in
all the countries analysed, but signi￿cant di⁄erences in indebtedness levels are observed across
countries: France shows the lowest levels for this variable (around 40% at the end of the sample
period), in line with the comparatively highest reliance of French ￿rms on shares and other
equity as a source of external ￿nance. The highest values are recorded for Italian ￿rms (around
65%),
The relative burden of debt is the ￿rms￿capacity to meet interest payments with the
results it generates (see Chart 5). It is de￿ned as the ratio of interest payments to earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization plus ￿nancial revenue. Therefore, it re￿ ects
the impact of changes in interest rates (related to general credit conditions at country level),
company pro￿tability and its indebtedness. As can be seen, this ratio showed a downward trend
in the second half of the nineties, in line with decreasing interest rates, and increased slightly
afterwards in the period 2000-2001, when a reduction in pro￿tability was recorded in most
countries. Over the sample period the typical French ￿rm shows the lowest debt-burden ratio,12
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while the typical Italian ￿rm shows the highest one, in line with the higher indebtedness and
lower pro￿tability ratios observed in this country. Di⁄erences in the debt structure of ￿rms are
also playing a role in explaining debt burden dispersion across countries. For example, Italian
￿rms have traditionally relied on expensive short-term debt ￿nancing, something that probably
contributes to their higher debt burden ratios (although this has changed in the recent years,
when they have importantly reduced the weight of short-term debt on their liabilities). Likewise,
the comparatively high reliance on inter-company loans in Belgium -a source of funds cheaper
than bank loans- probably contributes to explain the relatively low debt burden observed in this
country. Non-￿nancial corporations in Germany are those more dependent on bank loans, while
French companies are those that rely comparatively more on securities other than shares as a
source of external ￿nancing2.
To sum up, Italy is the country in which the position of the median ￿rm seems compar-
atively weaker while the strongest position is observed for French ￿rms, which are characterised
by the lowest levels of indebtedness and interest burden and by relatively high growth rates of
sales and high pro￿tability and investment ratios.
4 The impact of ￿nancial variables on ￿rms￿investment
decisions: descriptive evidence
The descriptive analysis of the previous section has shown that there exists a noticeable hetero-
geneity in the ￿nancial variables under consideration across countries not only in their develop-
ment over time but also in their levels. A key question to analyse is whether these di⁄erences in
￿nancial position are going to have an impact on ￿rms￿spending decisions and, more speci￿cally,
on ￿rms￿investment rates.
A simple way to obtain some preliminary evidence about how ￿nancial pressure a⁄ects
￿rms￿investment is to plot how the investment rate varies in each country across ￿rms facing
di⁄erent degree of ￿nancial pressure. For this purpose, Charts 6, 7 and 8 compare the median
level of the investment rate in each country for three di⁄erent corporate groupings, which are
de￿ned on the basis of their ￿nancial position. The latter is proxied by cash ￿ ow (Chart 6),
indebtedness (Chart 7) and debt burden (Chart 8).
In particular, the di⁄erent panels in Chart 6 present the median investment rate in each
2See Task Force of Monetary Policy Committee of the ESCB (2007) for a description of the liability composition
of non-￿nancial corporations￿balance sheets in euro area countries in the period 1995-2005.13
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country for ￿rms with high cash ￿ ow -over assets- (above the 90th percentile), medium cash ￿ ow
(￿rms for which this ratio stands between the 45th and the 55th percentile) and low cash ￿ ow
(lower decile). As can be seen, there is a clear relationship between pro￿ts generated and ￿rms￿
capital demand, as ￿rms with higher level of cash ￿ ow over their assets show higher investment
rates.
Chart 7 depicts the median investment rates for ￿rms facing di⁄erent degrees of ￿nancial
pressure when it is measured by the indebtedness level3. Although debt may have some desirable
properties (it allows ￿nancing projects in the absence of internal resources), the commitment
to repay the debt may have a negative in￿ uence on ￿rms￿spending decisions. The descriptive
evidence shown in the chart points in this direction for Belgium, Germany and France, since
investment rates present a negative relationship with indebtedness. In the two ￿rst of these
countries, a non-linear relationship seems to exist between indebtedness and investment rates,
since there are not marked di⁄erences in investment rates for ￿rms with a moderate and low
level of indebtedness while for highly indebted ￿rms their demand for capital is substantially
lower. In Italy, the Netherlands and Spain the relationship derived from this descriptive analysis
seems to be less clear-cut.
Chart 8 compares the investment rates using the relative burden of debt as a proxy for
￿nancial pressure. Firms with a higher debt burden in relation to their capacity to generate funds
have substantially lower investment rates in all countries. This simple descriptive analysis also
indicates that in some countries (especially Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain, and somewhat
less clearly, Italy) the relationship between ￿nancial pressure and investment might be non-linear,
as no marked di⁄erences in investment rates are observed between those ￿rms with the lowest
￿nancial pressure and those with average ￿nancial pressure, while ￿rms facing a high degree
of ￿nancial pressure show substantially lower investment rates. This hypothesis has already
been tested in Hernando and Martinez-Carrascal (2008) for a di⁄erent sample of Spanish ￿rms,
where evidence supporting a non-linear relationship between investment and ￿nancial position
was found.
Overall, this descriptive evidence suggests that ￿nancial pressure can negatively a⁄ect
￿rms￿capital demand. The existence of a link between ￿nancial position and ￿rms￿investment
rates becomes especially clear when ￿nancial pressure is proxied by means of pro￿tability and
debt burden. The relationship becomes somewhat more blurred when the relationship between
3As in the analysis presented for pro￿tability, ￿rms in three di⁄erent deciles (the 10% of ￿rms with the lowest
indebtedness, those for which this ratio stands between 45th and 55th percentiles of the distribution and, those
in the higher decile) are considered.14
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indebtedness and investment rates is analysed. The absence of a clear link in this case might
be the result of two opposite e⁄ects: on the one hand, highly indebted ￿rms may experience
problems in gaining access to additional external funds to ￿nance their projects; on the other
hand, companies with higher investment levels might be those that have been more successful
in attracting external funds to ￿nance their growth opportunities.
5 Model speci￿cation and estimation method
The estimation analysis in this section consists in examining the responsiveness of ￿xed invest-
ment to changes in the ￿nancial position faced by a company, which is proxied by means of
the three ￿nancial variables presented in the previous section: pro￿tability, indebtedness and
debt burden. The model estimated is an error-correction model which speci￿es a target level of
the capital stock and allows for a ￿ exible speci￿cation of the short-run investment dynamics, in
which we add di⁄erent ￿nancial indicators as potential explanatory variables. The depreciation
rate is subsumed into the unobserved ￿rm-speci￿c e⁄ects and it is assumed that variation in
the user cost of capital can be controlled for by including time-speci￿c, sectoral-speci￿c and
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where i indexes companies i=1,2..N and t indexes year t=1,2...T. ￿ denotes a ￿rst
di⁄erence, I/K is the investment rate, y is the log of real sales, k is the log of real ￿xed capital
stock, and Xit represents a vector of ￿nancial variables (pro￿tability, indebtedness and debt
burden) already described in the previous section These ￿nancial ratios are lagged one period to
reduce possible endogeneity. ￿i are company-speci￿c ￿xed e⁄ects, ￿t are time e⁄ects that control
4See Bond et al (1999) or Bond et al (2003) for details on the derivation of the investment model. More
structural models, such as Q models, would be more appropriate from a theoretical point of view because they
control for expectations about future pro￿tability and hence it can be argued that ￿nancial variables would
not enter the speci￿cation as proxies for future investment opportunities (see for example, Fazzari et al, 1988).
However this type of models can be signi￿cantly a⁄ected by measurement errors and has often failed to produce
signi￿cant and correctly signed key parameters. For this reason, we estimate an error correction model, which
is standard in the investment literature and which, as emphasized in Bond et al (1999), tends to display more
reasonable parameters than structural models. In any case, the estimation of a Q model is not possible here since
most of the ￿rms in the sample are not quoted and hence the usual Q variable cannot be constructed.15
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for macroeconomic in￿ uences on ￿xed investment common across companies and Sicontrol for
sectoral e⁄ects constant over time. "it is a serially-uncorrelated, but possibly heteroskedastic
error. The coe¢ cients ￿2 and ￿3 indicate the short-run responsiveness of ￿xed investment to
sales growth, whilst the coe¢ cient ￿4 indicates the speed of adjustment of the capital stock
towards its desired level. ￿ captures the impact of the ￿nancial ratio introduced in the equation.
A positive coe¢ cient is expected for pro￿tability, and negative ones for debt burden and indebt-
edness ratios. This equation is estimated separately for each one of the six countries considered
with the data contained in the AMADEUS database.
The estimation method consists of the GMM-System estimator proposed by Arellano
and Bover (1995) and examined in detail in Blundell and Bond (1998). These models control
for ￿xed e⁄ects with the estimator being an extension of the GMM estimator of Arellano and
Bond (1991) and estimates equations not only in ￿rst di⁄erences but also in levels. The use
of GMM-System estimator is especially justi￿ed in the case of autoregressive models with high
persistence in the data such that the lagged levels of a variable are not highly correlated with the
￿rst di⁄erence, something that results in ￿nite sample biases associated with weak instruments
in the ￿rst-di⁄erence estimator. Blundell and Bond (1998) show that in these circumstances also
including the levels equations in the system estimator o⁄ers signi￿cant gains, countering the bias.
They also show that in autoregressive-distributed lag models, ￿rst-di⁄erences of the variables
can be used as instruments in the levels equations provided that they are mean stationary. The
high levels of serial correlation displayed by several variables included in the models and the
fact that they can be regarded as mean stationary favour the use of a GMM-System estimator
rather than the ￿rst-di⁄erence estimator.
The estimation method requires the absence of second order serial correlation in the
￿rst di⁄erenced residuals for which the test of Arellano and Bond (1991) is presented (labelled
M2). If the underlying models residuals are indeed white noise then ￿rst-order serial correlation
should be expected in the ￿rst-di⁄erenced residuals for which we also present the test of Arellano
and Bond (1991), labelled M1. We also report the results of the Sargan test of overidentifying
restrictions as test for instrument validity in the GMM-System equations. Lagged levels of the
explanatory variables are used as instruments.
The estimation was initially carried out using the same set of instruments for all the
countries, but in some countries second order autocorrelation tests and Sargan tests rejected the
validity of the instruments. To avoid this problem, alternative sets of instruments were used
for the di⁄erent countries, checking afterwards if there were signi￿cant changes in the results16
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obtained. The signi￿cance of the variables of interest remains when using a common set of
instruments5.
6 Results
Table 2 shows the results obtained for the baseline speci￿cation (that is, before including ￿nancial
variables). As can be seen, the results are in line with those found in similar studies (see
amongst others Bond et al (2003) or Hernando and Martinez-Carrascal (2008)): the error-
correction term (k ￿ y)it￿2 is correctly signed and statistically signi￿cant and the sales growth
(either contemporaneous or lagged) has a positive short-run impact on investment, which is
statistically signi￿cant at conventional signi￿cance levels in almost all cases.6 Also in line with
these studies, lagged investment rate is found to be insigni￿cant in all the countries except
France. We ￿nd the expected ￿rst-order serial correlation in our ￿rst-di⁄erenced residuals while
there is no evidence of second order serial correlation, the key requirement for validity of our
instrumentation strategy. The Sargan test statistics are insigni￿cant at conventional (5%) levels.
Table 3 presents the same regression but including the pro￿tability indicator. For all
countries pro￿tability turns out to be signi￿cant: Italy shows the highest estimated coe¢ cient
(for each percentage point increase in pro￿tability, investment rate increases by 0.6 percentage
points), while in contrast Germany shows a relatively lower level in comparison with the rest
of the countries, somewhat less than half the one estimated for Italy. The country-ranking
according to the magnitude of the estimated cash ￿ ow coe¢ cient is the same as that reported in
Chatelain et al (2003) where cash ￿ ow sensitivities of investment have been tested for Germany,
France, Italy and Spain. As it has been extensively discussed in the literature on investment
and ￿nancial constraints, a signi￿cant cash ￿ ow coe¢ cient might not be enough to prove the
existence of ￿nancing constraints, since cash ￿ ow e⁄ects could just be a proxy for investment
opportunities. However, to the extent that a similar relationship between current cash ￿ ow and
5Just in one case (see footnote 11) the signi￿cance seems to depend more on the set of instruments used. See
Tables A1, A2 and A3 in Appendix 2 for results using common instruments for all countries.
6Just for Spain sales fall short of signi￿cance, although the p-value associated to lagged growth rate of sales
in this country is quite low -11.6%-. For the error correction term, the p-value is also somewhat above 10% in
the French case. An anonymous referee suggested that this lack of signi￿cance could be driven by the use of a
too heterogeneous sample and suggested to repeat the estimation presented in this paper using only companies
in the manufacturing sector. The results are presented in Appendix 3. This change in the sample does not
have substantial impact on the results, but indeed an increase in the signi￿cance of the error correction terms is
observed in some cases.17
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future pro￿tability across countries exists, di⁄erences in the estimated coe¢ cients on the cash
￿ ow variables are more likely to re￿ ect di⁄erences in the e⁄ects of ￿nancing constraints. The
results of a simple forecasting model for pro￿tability seem to point in this direction, as there
are no signi￿cant di⁄erences in the forecasting power of lagged or current cash ￿ ow for future
pro￿tability across countries.7
In addition to the relationship between investment rates and pro￿tability, it is also
relevant to know how companies may adjust in the light of balance sheet pressures linked to
their level of indebtedness. Table 4 shows the results obtained when the indebtedness ratio
is included in the baseline investment equation. In line with the descriptive evidence shown
above, a negative (and signi￿cant) coe¢ cient is obtained in Belgium and France. Also for Italy
and Spain evidence in favour of a contractive impact of indebtedness on investment rates is
found, which was not so clear-cut according to the descriptive analysis. In the Germany and
in the Netherlands this variable turns out to be insigni￿cant. However, in the Dutch case, the
rather limited signi￿cance of this ratio seems to be linked to the fact that the coe¢ cients are
estimated quite imprecisely, rather than to a low magnitude8. Hence, these results suggest that
a high level of debt can lead to balance sheet adjustments in the form of companies deferring or
foregoing investment projects (see Vermeulen, 2002 for an industry-level study). The comparison
of coe¢ cients across countries shows that the largest sensitivity of investment to indebtedness
changes is observed in the Netherlands and, to a minor extent, in Italy, while German ￿rms
present the lowest sensitivity.
Finally, Table 5 shows the reports obtained when ￿nancial pressure is proxied by debt
burden. Signi￿cant (negative) coe¢ cients are indications that monetary policy has an impact
on ￿rms￿investment rates through the induced changes in the costs of debt servicing. Only
in Germany the signi￿cance of this indicator is somewhat more limited (p-value=14%).9 The
highest response to changes in debt burden is estimated for the Netherlands and Italy.10 Belgium,
France and Spain show lower (and similar) investment rate sensitivities, which are above the
7Results available upon request.
8When the analysis is just based on a more homogeneous sample including only manufacturing ￿rms, this
ratio is found to be signi￿cant for a 10% signi￿cance level (p-value=6.6%. See Appendix 3).
9The signi￿cance of the debt burden indicator in Germany is also more dependent on the set of instruments
used than in the rest of the countries. In fact, when using common instruments for all countries, the signi￿cance
of this variable decreases further (see Appendix 2).
10The p-value associated to the Sargan test in the Italian case is very low (1.4%), but the M2 statistic indicates
that the key condition for instrument validity holds. On the basis of Monte Carlo analysis, Blundell et al (2000)
report that the Sargan test tends to over-reject in the context of this estimator. In line with this, Nickell and
Nicolitsas (1999) report signi￿cant Sargan test statistics for all their regression results.18
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estimates for Germany.
Overall, these econometric results support the hypothesis that ￿nancial pressure faced
by ￿rms is important to explain corporate decisions on ￿xed investment, as indebtedness, debt
burden and pro￿tability indicators are found to be signi￿cant when included in investment
equations.
These results can be used to quantify the impact of monetary policy on investment
through the induced changes in the costs of debt servicing. Similarly to Nickell and Nicolitsas
(1999), we analyse which is the impact of an increase in interest rates of 100 basis points, from
4%, which was the level of the average cost of debt ￿nancing in the euro area at the end of 2005,
to 5%. Under the assumption of no ￿xed rate debt, this implies an increase in debt burden close
to 25%. This can be used, together with the information on the average levels of debt burden
across countries in 2005, to compute the impact on investment rate of this increase in interest
rates at the end of the sample period. The results show that the largest contractive impact
would be observed in Italy: the average company in this country would reduce its investment
rate by 1 percentage point (which amounts to 7.3% of the mean value in 2005) while in the
Netherlands it would be 0.6pp (4.1% of the mean value). The lowest impact would be observed
for Belgium, Germany and France (around 0.3pp) while the impact for Spain would also be
relatively moderate (0.4pp). The impact in Italy is not only higher, but also more unevenly
distributed, given the larger dispersion that the distribution in debt burden presents in this
country.
Hence, even if the marginal impact of changes in the debt burden on investment is es-
timated to be lower for Italy than for the Netherlands, the impact of the increase in ￿nancing
costs would be higher for the average Italian company, as it faces a higher degree of ￿nan-
cial pressure. Likewise, in spite of the fact that the coe¢ cient estimated for France is higher
than for Germany, the average ￿rm in France is the one less a⁄ected by the increase given its
comparatively sounder ￿nancial position. Overall, this simple exercise illustrates that both the
heterogeneity in the magnitude of the marginal impact of debt burden on investment rates and
in the ￿nancial position are important to make a proper assessment of the impact of changes in
monetary policy on investment rates.19
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7 What drives di⁄erences in investment rate sensitivity to
￿nancial pressure changes across countries?
The results presented in Section 5 point to signi￿cant di⁄erences across countries in the sensi-
tivity shown by investment rates to changes in ￿rms￿￿nancial pressure. This sensitivity seems
relatively low in Germany, while it is de￿nitely higher in the Netherlands and in Italy. Di⁄er-
ences in the size and sector compositions of the samples used, as well as di⁄erences in country
￿nancial structures, might be important elements to explain those di⁄erences in sensitivities.
A ￿rst factor that can be potentially contributing to explaining the di⁄erences in the
results across countries is the di⁄erent composition of the sample in each of the countries con-
sidered. As presented in Section 2, samples for Belgium, France, Italy and Spain show a much
higher percentage of SMEs, while in Germany and the Netherlands the size composition of the
sample is less representative of the actual size composition in the population and more biased
towards large ￿rms. SMEs are usually thought to be more a⁄ected by the asymmetric infor-
mation problems that are the basis for the existence of ￿nancing constraints, since they are
expected to be more opaque towards external investors. In particular, they do not usually enter
into publicly visible contracts and do not usually issue traded securities that are continuously
priced in public markets. The evidence available in this respect in the empirical literature is,
however, inconclusive, as there are con￿ icting results regarding the correlation between size and
￿nancing constraints11. As for our econometric results, this factor could explain why investment
rate sensitivity to ￿nancial position changes is relatively low in Germany, but not why it is found
to be especially large in the Netherlands. In any case, when we allow for a di⁄erent marginal
impact of indebtedness, debt burden and pro￿tability for SMEs and large ￿rms, our regression
results do not conclusively point to SMEs investment rates being di⁄erently and, in particular,
more negatively a⁄ected by changes in their ￿nancial position than large ￿rms (see Table 6). In
fact, the point estimates of the di⁄erence in the sensitivity of investment to ￿nancial factors be-
tween SMEs and large ￿rms are not only non-signi￿cant in general but also non￿ systematically
positive or negative. Only for Belgium we ￿nd some evidence in favour of a higher contractive
impact for SMEs of increases in ￿nancial pressure on investment rates, in line with the results
presented in Butzen et al (2003) for this country. Overall, our results might be indicating that
size is not a good indicator of informational asymmetries that are often mentioned as one of the
main factors leading into ￿nancing costraints.
11See Task Force of the Monetary Policy Committee of the ESCB (2007) for a review of the academic literature
on the relationship between ￿nancing constraints and size.20
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Di⁄erences in the sectoral composition of the sample could also be driving the di⁄erences
in investment rates￿sensitivities across countries. There can be di⁄erences in the degree of
￿nancing constraints faced by ￿rms in the various sectors due, for example, to di⁄erences in the
available collateral. As seen in Table 1, close to 30% of the companies in the German sample
are in the electricity, gas and water supply sector, transport, storage and communications, while
in Italy and France this percentage is hardly above 5%. The Spanish sample also shows a low
rate of companies in this sector (below 7%), while for the Netherlands the observed percentage
is quite higher (12%). As ￿rms in these sectors keep a high percentage of ￿xed assets in their
balance sheets, they might be able to obtain more easily external ￿nance than ￿rms in other
sectors such as construction and wholesale and retail trade, for which short-term assets (usually
less suitable to be used as collateral) are more important. However, we do not ￿nd a clear-
cut evidence supporting systematic sectoral di⁄erences in the impact of ￿nancial position on
investment across countries (see Table 7).
Another reason why ￿nancing constraints might be more powerful in some countries
than in others is that ￿nancial systems deal di⁄erently with asymmetric information problems.
In this sense, it is commonly argued that ￿nancing constraints might be more severe in more
market-oriented ￿nancial systems because borrowers and lenders operate at arms-length rela-
tionship compared to bank-based systems, where banks invest in long-term relationships with
their clients, thereby reducing asymmetric information problems. The results in Bond et al.
(2003), for example, point in this direction: they ￿nd higher sensitivity of investment rates to
changes in cash ￿ ow in the United Kingdom than in more bank-based systems such as Belgium,
France and Germany. Also Valderrama (2003), for example, ￿nds that Austrian companies with
tighter relationships with the main bank react less to cash ￿ ow than ￿rms with less intense rela-
tionships.12 The results found here are partly in line with the relationship channel hypothesis,
as Germany shows the lowest sensitivity of investment rates to changes in ￿nancial variables
while the Netherlands stands in the opposite extreme. The ￿house banks￿system prevailing in
Germany, in which ￿rms establish ￿nancial relationships with only one bank, implies a much
closer linkage to a single bank than in many other countries, something that can help to reduce
asymmetric information problems. In any case, this hypothesis has not been tested directly in
the paper and our estimated results can also be consistent with alternative explanations. In
fact, while the sensitivity seems to be the highest in the Netherlands, a more market-oriented
12Leaving aside the advantages of close relationships with lenders for a given indebtedness level, ￿rms more
dependent on bank ￿nancing will be more a⁄ected by changes in the supply of loans than ￿rms that have easy
access to other sources of external ￿nancing. In line with this, Haan and Sterken (2006) conclude that small
private ￿rms use less debt after a monetary tightening, but somewhat less in bank-based economies.21
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system13, in the case of Belgium and France, where equity ￿nancing plays an important role,
investment sensitivity is not found to be high in comparison with the rest of the countries. In the
case of Belgium, this could be partly explained by the existence of pyramidal ownership struc-
tures, with holding companies playing a signi￿cant role in the ￿nancing and in the management
of their a¢ liated ￿rms hence lowering the external ￿nance premium.
The relationship channel cannot explain why Italy shows a comparatively high investment
sensitivity to changes in ￿nancial position. It could be partly related, though, to the fact that
a high percentage of loans is backed by collateral, which might result in a more accentuated
impact of the balance sheet channel (since the negative impact on asset prices -and hence on
collateral values- of monetary policy contractions might have a more signi￿cant impact on credit
availability).14 An additional factor that can contribute to the high sensitivity estimated for
Italy is the comparatively weaker ￿nancial position observed for ￿rms in this country, if a non-
linear impact of ￿nancial position on investment exists. Descriptive evidence shown in Section
3 might point in this direction, especially for the debt burden indicator.15
8 Concluding remarks
We have analysed the sensitivity of investment to changes in ￿nancial pressure faced by ￿rms
with a large sample of ￿rms in six euro area countries (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, the
Netherlands and Spain), which broadly represent 90% of GDP in the euro area. Financial
pressure has been proxied by ￿rm indebtedness, debt burden and pro￿tability. One positive
characteristic of the database used for the analysis is that the percentage of smaller ￿rms in
these samples, that are those expected to be more a⁄ected by asymmetric information problems
and, as a result, by ￿nancial constraints, is much higher than in previous studies.
All in all, our results indicate that ￿rms￿￿nancial position conditions their capital ex-
penditures, as ￿nancial position enters signi￿cantly the investment equation when it is proxied
by cash ￿ ow, indebtedness and debt burden. The results show di⁄erences in the investment
13This country appears to show the highest investment sensitivity to changes in indebtedness and debt burden,
while for cash ￿ow this country would range in the middle (in a more homogeneous sample with only man-
ufacturing ￿rms, the sensitivity would be in the upper range also for the cash ￿ow indicator. See Appendix
3).
14See Ehrmann et al. (2001) for an analysis of the structure of the banking and the ￿nancial markets across
euro area countries and its impact on the role of banks in the monetary policy transmission.
15Also, as mentioned above, Hernando and Martinez-Carrascal (2008) test this hypothesis and ￿nd evidence
of non-linearities in the impact of ￿nancial position on investment for Spanish non-￿nancial corporations.22
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sensitivities across countries. For instance, ￿rms in Germany are found to be the ones with the
lowest marginal impact of ￿nancial pressure on investment rates, while the highest impact has
been found for Dutch and Italian ￿rms.
We have also investigated if the di⁄erences in sensitivity found across countries can be
due to di⁄erences in the sample composition and more speci￿cally to sectoral or size composition
di⁄erences. The results do not point in this direction, since no signi￿cant di⁄erences have been
found in investment rate responsiveness to changes in ￿nancial pressure for di⁄erent size groups.
Neither systematic sectoral di⁄erences in this sensitivity have been found.
The analysis has also given an insight on how, by altering the ￿nancial pressure expe-
rienced by ￿rms in servicing their debt, monetary policy may operate through the corporate
sector. It has been illustrated how the heterogeneity both in the magnitude of the marginal im-
pact of debt burden on investment rates and in the level of indebtedness is important to evaluate
potential asymmetries on the impact of changes in monetary policy on investment rates.23
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Belgium France Germany Italy the Netherlands Spain
I/K investment rate mean 0.150 0.170 0.123 0.176 0.156 0.172
median 0.113 0.116 0.093 0.132 0.129 0.118
∆y sales growth mean 0.015 0.023 0.017 0.000 0.019 0.030
median 0.020 0.023 0.018 0.008 0.018 0.029
(D-L)/A net indebtedness mean 0.517 0.433 0.563 0.623 0.512 0.475
median 0.529 0.449 0.551 0.661 0.528 0.499
db interest debt burden mean 0.198 0.183 0.291 0.318 0.186 0.267
median 0.115 0.093 0.176 0.222 0.120 0.176
CF/A profitability mean 0.073 0.089 0.069 0.054 0.097 0.083
median 0.065 0.078 0.067 0.042 0.090 0.071
Number of firms  3425 43880 532 27607 658 45880
Number of observations 26504 332082 3637 205406 4974 336001
Quoted firms in % of total firms 0.6 0.3 11.8 0.1 7.9 0.1
SMEs in % of total firms 86.6 96.2 35.7 96.8 35.1 98.2
Sectors (% firms)
Construction 8.4 11.1 6.2 6.1 5.6 12.2
Manufacturing 34.3 24.2 22.0 46.4 35.0 31.5
Services 15.4 24.9 30.5 9.0 10.8 17.8
Trade 33.2 34.1 11.8 33.5 36.8 31.8
Electricity,  gas, water supply, 8.7 5.8 29.5 5.0 11.9 6.8
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Table 2. Baseline specification 
 
coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error
(I/K)it-1 0.168 0.127 -0.116 0.118 0.357 0.162
** -0.065 0.170 0.041 0.128 0.203 0.148
(Dy)it 0.072 0.064 0.095 0.060 0.311 0.149
** 0.430 0.126
*** 0.078 0.088 0.100 0.086
(Dy)it-1 0.078 0.035
** 0.091 0.034

















Notes: All equations include time and sectoral dummies.Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard errors reported. Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the
robust one-step method (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998). Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported). Mj is a test of jth-order serial
correlation in the first-differenced residuals (p-values reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged values of the regressors: Belgium: (I/K) (t-5, t-6), ∆y (t-2 to
t-4) (k-y) (t-4 to t-6); Germany: (I/K) (t-4), ∆y (t-2 to t-4) (k-y) (t-3 to t-5); France: (I/K) (t-6 to t-7), ∆y (t-6) (k-y) (t-5 to t-6); Italy: (I/K) (t-7), ∆y (t-6, t-7) (k-y) (t-5 to t-6);
Netherlands: (I/K) (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4) (k-y) (t-3 to t-4); Spain (I/K) (t-7), ∆y (t-6) (k-y) (t-6 to t-7). In levels equations, first differences of the regressors dated as follows:
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 Table 3. Baseline specification plus cash flow ratio (CF/A)  
 
coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error
(I/K)it-1 0.180 0.127 -0.141 0.102 0.142 0.142 -0.105 0.171 0.112 0.099 0.265 0.140
*
(Dy)it 0.005 0.056 0.046 0.059 0.357 0.097
*** 0.470 0.099
*** 0.100 0.077 0.120 0.089
(Dy)it-1 0.037 0.027 0.063 0.031































Notes: All equations include time and sectoral dummies. Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard errors reported. Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the
robust one-step method (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998). Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported). Mj is a test of jth-order serial
correlation in the first-differenced residuals (p-values reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged values of the regressors: Belgium: I/K (t-5, t-6), ∆y (t-2 to t-
4), (k-y) (t-4 to t-6), CF/A (t-4, t-5); Germany: I/K (t-4), ∆y (t-2 to t-4) (k-y) (t-3 to t-5) CF/A (t-4 to t-6); France: I/K (t-6 to t-7), ∆y (t-6), (k-y) (t-5 to t-6), CF/A (t-4, t-5); Italy: I/K (t-
7), ∆y (t-6, t-7), (k-y) (t-5 to t-6); Netherlands: I/K (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3 to t-4) CF/A (t-4, t-5); Spain I/K (t-7), ∆y (t-6), (k-y) (t-6 to t-7), CF/A (t-5). In levels equations,
first differences of the regressors dated as follows: Belgium:∆y (t-3) and CF/A (t-5); Germany ∆y (t-4), CF/A (t-4); France ∆y (t-5); Italy ∆y (t-5), CF/A (t-3); Netherlands: ∆y (t-4),









Table 4. Baseline specification plus indebtedness ratio ((D-L)/A) 
 
coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error
(I/K)it-1 0.172 0.095




















* -0.022 0.115 -0.058 0.021
*** -0.075 0.036

















Notes: All equations include time and sectoral dummies. Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard errors reported. Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the
robust one-step method (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998). Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported). Mj is a test of jth-order serial
correlation in the first-differenced residuals (p-values reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged values of the regressors: Belgium: I/K (t-5, t-6), ∆y (t-2 to t-
4), (k-y) (t-4 to t-6), (D-L)/A (t-3 to t-5); Germany: I/K (t-4), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3 to t-5), (D-L)/A (t-3 to t-5); France: I/K (t-6, t-7), ∆y (t-6), (k-y) (t-5, t-6), (D-L)/A (t-4, t-5); Italy:
I/K (t-7), ∆y (t-6, t-7), (k-y) (t-5, t-6) (D-L)/A (t-5); Netherlands: I/K (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3, t-4), (D-L)/A (t-3 to t-5); Spain I/K (t-7), ∆y (t-6), (k-y) (t-6, t-7). In levels
equations, first differences of the regressors dated as follows: Belgium: ∆y (t-3), (D-L)/A (t-4); Germany ∆y (t-4); France ∆y (t-5), (D-L)/A (t-4); Italy ∆y and (D-L)/A (t-5); Netherlands:
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Table 5. Baseline specification plus debt burden ratio (db)      
 
coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error
(I/K)it-1 0.155 0.106 -0.108 0.111 0.176 0.097
* -0.198 0.122 -0.055 0.056 0.261 0.125
**
(Dy)it 0.073 0.055 0.078 0.053 0.398 0.128
*** 0.299 0.080





















Notes: All equations include time and sectoral dummies. Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard errors reported. Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the
robust one-step method (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998). Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported). Mj is a test of jth-order serial
correlation in the first-differenced residuals (p-values reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged values of the regressors: Belgium: (I/K) (t-5, t-6), ∆y (t-2 to
t-4) (k-y) (t-4 to t-6), db (t-3 to t-5); Germany: (I/K) (t-4), ∆y (t-2 to t-4) (k-y) (-3 to t-5), db (t-5); France: (I/K) (t-6 to t-7), ∆y (t-6) (k-y) (t-5 to t-6); Italy: (I/K) (t-7), ∆y (t-6, t-7) (k-
y) (t-5 to t-6), br (t-6); Netherlands: (I/K) (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4) (k-y) (t-3 to t-4) db (t-3 to t-5); Spain (I/K) (t-7), ∆y (t-6) (k-y) (t-6 to t-7), db (t-6 to t-7). In levels equations, first
differences of the regressors dated as follows: Belgium:∆y (t-3), (D-L)/A (t-4); Germany ∆y (t-4) and db (t-2); France ∆y (t-5), db (t-2); Italy ∆y and db (t-5); Netherlands: ∆y and db



















Belgium Netherlands Italy France Germany
 
 
Table 6. Impact of financial variables on investment. Differential impact for small and medium-size firms 
 




*** 0.306 0.343 0.698 0.229
*** 0.128 0.120
Diff. SMEs 0.332 0.201
* -0.461 0.288 -0.298 0.249 0.172 0.323 -0.475 0.247
* 0.169 0.118
Indebtedness -0.021 0.039 -0.069 0.126 -0.042 0.036 -0.065 0.031
** -0.124 0.085 -0.059 0.061
Diff. SMEs -0.050 0.038 0.071 0.066 0.021 0.042 0.000 0.056 -0.043 0.079 0.022 0.057
Debt burden -0.003 0.048 -0.054 0.037 -0.056 0.051 -0.009 0.087 -0.118 0.081 -0.072 0.058
Diff. SMEs -0.094 0.052
* -0.013 0.058 -0.025 0.052 -0.119 0.085 0.039 0.099 0.009 0.056
Belgium
Note: Diff. SMEs captures, for each financial ratio, the differential impact of that ratio on investment rates for SMEs. *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1% significance level,
respectively.
Spain Netherlands Italy France Germany
 
 
Table 7. Impact of financial variables on investment, allowing different impact for different sectors 
 
coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error
Profitability 0.453 0.156





Diff. sector 2 -0.072 0.079 0.075 0.070 0.225 0.060
*** 0.017 0.088 0.008 0.131 0.130 0.046
***
Diff. sector 3 -0.008 0.104 0.113 0.380 0.252 0.035
*** 0.223 0.124
* 0.021 0.230 0.119 0.040
***
Diff. sector 4 0.089 0.050
* 0.032 0.044 0.080 0.044
* 0.032 0.068 0.131 0.130 0.033 0.030
Diff. sector 5 -0.089 0.056 0.039 0.185 0.042 0.045 0.034 0.048 -0.165 0.104 0.008 0.026
Indebtedness 0.180 0.156
*** -0.330 0.147 -0.769 0.608 -0.039 0.229
*** -0.085 0.122 -0.015 0.116
***
Diff. sector 2 -1.513 0.079 0.294 0.070 1.557 1.739 -0.012 0.088 -0.007 0.165 0.096 0.046
***
Diff. sector 3 0.004 0.104 0.368 0.380 1.974 1.196
* 0.192 0.124
* 0.067 0.262 0.033 0.040
***
Diff. sector 4 0.057 0.050
* 0.334 0.044 1.086 0.671 -0.047 0.068 0.199 0.166 -0.006 0.030
Diff. sector 5 -0.527 0.056 0.206 0.185 0.823 0.850 -0.026 0.048 -0.164 0.140 -0.041 0.026





Diff. sector 2 -0.164 0.125 0.021 0.067 0.290 0.060
*** -0.176 0.116 -0.044 0.127 0.131 0.044
***
Diff. sector 3 -0.063 0.134 0.112 0.371 0.210 0.029
*** -0.284 0.154
* 0.002 0.239 0.085 0.036
**
Diff. sector 4 -0.200 0.234 -0.005 0.047 0.089 0.036
** 0.092 0.067 0.135 0.123 0.022 0.028
Diff. sector 5 -0.165 0.080 -0.005 0.185 0.013 0.036 -0.010 0.073 -0.178 0.104
* -0.015 0.022
France Belgium
Note: Diff. sector j captures, for each financial ratio, the differential impact of that ratio on investment rates for sector j. Manufacturing sector is the reference sector (sector 1). Sector 2 includes firms in
the electricity gas, water supply, transport, storage and communication sectors. Sector 3, 4 and 5 includes companies in the construction, services and trade sectors, respectively.*,**,*** indicate
significance at 10%,5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
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Charts 1-5:  Selected variables over time 
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Charts 6-8:  Relationship between financial position and investment level 
 
Chart 6: Cash flow and level of investment 
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Source: Amadeus, Bureau van Dijk and own calculations 
Note: The different panels present the median investment rate in each country for firms with high cash flow (above 
the 90
th percentile), medium cash flow (firms for which this ratio stands between the 45
th and the 55
th percentile) and 
low cash flow (lower decile). The investment rate is defined as the ratio of gross fixed capital formation over capital 
stock, while cash flow is normalized by total assets. 28
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Chart 7: Indebtedness and level of investment 
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Source: Amadeus, Bureau van Dijk and own calculations 
Note: The different panels present the median investment rate in each country for firms with high indebtedness 
(above the 90th percentile), medium indebtedness (firms for which this ratio stands between the 45th and the 55th 
percentile) and low indebtednes (lower decile). The investment rate is defined as the ratio of gross fixed capital 
formation over capital stock, while indebtedness  is the ratio of net debt (debt minus cash and cash equivalents) over 
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Chart 8: Debt burden and level of investment 
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Source: Amadeus, Bureau van Dijk and own calculations 
Note: The different panels present the median investment rate in each country for firms with high debt burden 
(above the 90th percentile), medium debt burden (firms for which this ratio stands between the 45th and the 55th 
percentile) and low debt burden (lower decile). The investment rate is defined as the ratio of gross fixed capital 
formation over capital stock, while debt burden  is the ratio of interest payments over gross revenue plus financial 
revenue  30
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Appendix 1: Data appendix 
Investment (I) 
The AMADEUS database does not contain data on gross investment directly, but it can be calculated 
using the data on capital stock and depreciation as follows:  
 
  
Capital stock ( it K
)
) 
The capital stock is constructed using the perpetual inventory method. Since the values available for the 
capital stock are at book value (that is, at historical prices), we multiply the value at historical prices for 
the first year of observation available for each firm by a factor adjusting for historical inflation to get an 
estimation of the initial value ( it K
1
)
) of the capital stock at replacement value (that is, at time t1 prices). 




where d is the depreciation rate of the stock of capital (based on aggregate data at country level).  
Investment rate ( it I / 1 - it K )  
Investment divided by the capital stock 
Indebtedness ratio ( it L D ) ( - / it A )  
Debt minus cash and cash equivalents divided by total assets  
Debt burden (dbt)  
Interest payments divided by gross revenue plus financial revenue  
Cash flow (CFt/At-1)  
Post-tax profit plus depreciation of fixed assets divided by total assets  
 
For interest  debt  burden, when  companies  have  a negative  or  zero  value for the denominator and  a 
positive value for the numerator, the ratio is set equal to the value of the 99
th percentile that year; when 
the numerator is zero, the ratio is set equal to zero, for any value of the denominator.  
For all the variables used in the analysis, when the value is over the 99
th percentile, this value is changed 
for that corresponding to this percentile. 
 
it it it I K K + - = -1 ) 1 (
) )
d
it it it it on Depreciati K K I + - = -131
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Appendix 2: Regression results with common instruments for all countries  
 
 
Table A1. Baseline specification plus cash flow ratio (CF/A) 
 
coef std error coef std error coef std error coef std error coef std error coef std error
(I/K)it-1 0.012 0.033 -0.149 0.109 -0.146 0.020
*** -0.140 0.057
** 0.112 0.099 0.323 0.069
***
(∆y)it 0.045 0.047 0.080 0.060 0.421 0.048
*** 0.250 0.029













































Note: All equations include time and sectoral dummies. Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard reported. Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step method (Blundell
and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998). Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported). Mj is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (p-values
reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged values of the regressors: I/K (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3 to t-4) CF/A (t-4, t-5). In levels equations, first differences of the
regressors dated as follows: ∆y (t-4), CF/A (t-3).*,**,*** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
Netherlands Belgium Germany France
 
 
Table A2. Baseline specification plus indebtedness (D-L/A) 
 
coef std error coef std error coef std error coef std error coef std error coef std error
(I/K)it-1 0.015 0.029 -0.019 0.116 -0.138 0.011
*** 0.271 0.041
*** 0.030 0.091 -0.111 0.016
***
(∆y)it 0.092 0.044


















** 0.035 0.048 -0.102 0.014
*** -0.115 0.017


















Notes: All equations include time and sectoral dummies. Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard . Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step
method (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998). Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported). Mj is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the
first-differenced residuals (p-values reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged values of the regressors: I/K (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3, t-4), (D-L)/A (t-3
to t-5). In levels equations, first differences of the regressors dated as follows: ∆y and (D-L)/A (t-4). *,**,*** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1% significance level, respectively.





Table A3. Baseline specification plus debt burden (db) 
 
coef std error coef std error coef std error coef std error coef std error coef std error
(I/K)it-1 0.025 0.031 0.010 0.037 -0.182 0.020
































Notes: All equations include time and sectoral dummies. Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard errors reported. Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust
one-step method (Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998). Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported). Mj is a test of jth-order serial correlation
in the first-differenced residuals (p-values reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged values of the regressors: (I/K) (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4) (k-y) (t-3 to t-4) db (t-
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Appendix 3: Regression results for manufacturing firms 
 
 
Baseline specification plus cash flow ratio (CF/A) 
 
coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error
(I/K)it-1 0.086 0.089 -0.103 0.080 0.021 0.105 -0.159 0.107 0.033 0.099 0.163 0.108



























(CF/A) (t-2).*,**,*** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1% significance level, respectively.










Notes: All equations include time dummies. Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard errors reported. Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step method
(Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998). Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported). Mj is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the first-differenced
residuals (p-values reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged values of the regressors: Belgium: I/K (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-4 to t-5), (CF/A) (t-4, t-5); Germany:
I/K (t-4), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3 to t-5), (CF/A)/A (t-4 to t-6); France: I/K (t-5, t-7), ∆y (t-4,t-6), (k-y) (t-6, t-7), (CF/A)/A (t-4); Italy: I/K (t-7), ∆y (t-6, t-7), (k-y) (t-5, t-6); Netherlands: I/K (t-4, t-5),
∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3, t-4), (CF/A) (t-4, t-5); Spain I/K (t-5, t-6), ∆y (t-6), (k-y) (t-5, t-6), (CF/A) (t-4 to t-6). In levels equations, first differences of the regressors dated as follows: Belgium: ∆y (t-












Baseline specification plus indebtedness (D-L/A) 
 
coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error
(I/K)it-1 0.077 0.089 -0.061 0.124 0.159 0.091
* -0.007 0.093 0.040 0.118
** 0.396 0.129
***

























4).*,**,*** indicate significance at 10%,5% and 1% significance level, respectively.










Notes: All equations include time dummies. Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard errors reported. Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step method (Blundell
and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998). Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported). Mj is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (p-
values reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged values of the regressors: Belgium: I/K (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-4, t-5), (D-L)/A (t-3 to t-5); Germany: I/K (t-4), ∆y (t-
2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3 to t-5), (D-L)/A (t-3, t-4); France: I/K (t-5, t-7), ∆y (t-4 to t-6), (k-y) (t-6, t-7), (D-L)/A (t-5, t-6); Italy: I/K (t-7), ∆y (t-6, t-7), (k-y) (t-5, t-6) (D-L)/A (t-5); Netherlands: I/K (t-4, t-5),
∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3, t-4), (D-L)/A (t-3 to t-5); Spain I/K (t-5, t-6), ∆y (t-6), (k-y) (t-5, t-6). In levels equations, first differences of the regressors dated as follows: Belgium: ∆y (t-3), (k-y) (t-3), (D-












Baseline specification plus debt burden (db) 
 
coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error coeff std error
(I/K)it-1 0.127 0.083 -0.131 0.108 0.069 0.076 -0.124 0.086 0.103 0.114 0.209 0.117
*































Notes: All equations include time dummies. Estimated coefficients and asymptotic robust standard errors reported. Estimation by GMM-SYSTEM estimator using the robust one-step method
(Blundell and Bond, 1998; Arellano and Bond, 1998). Sargan is a Sargan Test of over-identifying restrictions (p-value reported). Mj is a test of jth-order serial correlation in the first-differenced
residuals (p-values reported). Instruments: in first-differences equation, following lagged values of the regressors:Belgium: I/K (t-4, t-5), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-4 to t-5), db (t-3, t-4); Germany: I/K (t-
4), ∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3 to t-5), db/A (t-3 to t-4); France: I/K (t-5, t-7), ∆y (t-4,t-6), (k-y) (t-6, t-7), db/A (t-2, t-3); Italy: I/K (t-7), ∆y (t-6, t-7), (k-y) (t-5, t-6), db (t-6); Netherlands: I/K (t-4, t-5),
∆y (t-2 to t-4), (k-y) (t-3, t-4), db (t-4, t-5); Spain I/K (t-5, t-6), ∆y (t-6), (k-y) (t-5, t-6), db (t-4 to t-6). In levels equations, first differences of the regressors dated as follows: Belgium: ∆y (t-3), (k-y) (t-
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